high CVSS 8.8 EPSS 0.20%

CVE-2026-64010·Kernel vulnerability

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: llcp: Fix use-after-free race in nfc_llcp_recv_cc() A race condition exists in the NFC LLCP connection state machine where the connection acceptance packet (CC) can be processed concurrently with socket release. This can lead to a use-after-free of the socket object. When nfc_llcp_recv_cc() moves the socket from the connecting_sockets list to the sockets list, it does so without holding the socket lock. If llcp_sock_release() is executing concurrently, it might have already unlinked the socket and dropped its references, which can result in nfc_llcp_recv_cc() linking a freed socket into the live list. Fix this by holding lock_sock() during the state transition and list movement in nfc_llcp_recv_cc(). After acquiring the lock, check if the socket is still hashed to ensure it hasn't already been unlinked and marked for destruction by the release path. This aligns the locking pattern with recv_hdlc() and recv_disc().

Severity
high
Software
Kernel
Fixed in
7.0.12
Published

How likely is exploitation

FIRST's Exploit Prediction Scoring System puts the probability of this CVE being exploited in the next 30 days at 0.20% — higher than 9% of all published CVEs. EPSS is an independent forecast of exploitation, not a severity rating: it says nothing about how much damage a successful attack does, which is what a CVSS score measures.

Read the two together. CVE-2026-64010 scores 8.8 on CVSS, so a successful attack would be serious — but at 0.20%, almost nobody is currently attempting it. That is a different situation from a flaw under mass exploitation, and it is usually the difference between patching on your next maintenance window and patching tonight.

Affected versions

From: 6.19

Until: 7.0.12

Fixed in: 7.0.12

How to fix this CVE

Update your Linux kernel to version 7.0.12 or later to patch a use-after-free vulnerability in the NFC LLCP subsystem. This race condition affects kernel versions 6.19 through 7.0.11 and can be triggered through concurrent NFC connection state transitions. Apply the kernel update immediately and reboot to ensure the patch is active.

sudo dnf update kernel && sudo reboot

Defensia detects this vulnerability

How to check if you are affected

  1. Run 'uname -r' to check the current kernel version and confirm if it falls within the vulnerable range (6.19 to 7.0.11)
  2. Execute 'cat /proc/net/nfc' to verify if NFC LLCP subsystem is loaded; if the file is empty or doesn't exist, NFC is not actively configured
  3. Check kernel logs for NFC-related errors using 'sudo dmesg | grep -i nfc' or 'sudo journalctl -u kernel | grep nfc' to identify any LLCP connection state machine anomalies
  4. After applying the patch, run 'uname -r' again and verify the kernel version is 7.0.12 or higher, then check 'cat /proc/version' to confirm the update is reflected in the running kernel

FAQ

What is CVE-2026-64010?

CVE-2026-64010 is a use-after-free race condition in the Linux kernel's NFC LLCP (Logical Link Control and Multiplexing) subsystem. The vulnerability occurs when an NFC connection acceptance packet (CC) is processed concurrently with socket release, potentially allowing a freed socket object to be relinked into an active connection list, leading to memory corruption or denial of service.

Is CVE-2026-64010 being actively exploited?

No, CVE-2026-64010 is not listed on the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog and no public exploit code is currently available. However, the high CVSS score of 8.8 indicates significant risk if triggered.

What versions of Kernel are affected by CVE-2026-64010?

Linux kernel versions 6.19 through 7.0.11 are affected. The vulnerability has been resolved in version 7.0.12 and later stable releases.

How do I check if my server is vulnerable to CVE-2026-64010?

Run 'uname -r' to display your kernel version. If the output shows a version between 6.19 and 7.0.11 (inclusive), your system is vulnerable. Cross-reference with 'cat /proc/version' for confirmation.

Does Defensia detect CVE-2026-64010?

Yes — Defensia's CVE advisory scanner compares installed package versions against the NVD database. If the Linux kernel is installed on a monitored server, CVE-2026-64010 will appear in your dashboard with remediation steps.

Related Kernel CVEs

CVE-2026-63795CVSS 10In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 9p: avoid putting oldfid in p9_client_walk() error path When p9_client_walk() is called with clone set to false, fid aliases oldfid. If the walk subsequently fails after the request has been sent, the error path jumps to clunk_fid, which currently calls p9_fid_put(fid) unconditionally. This drops a reference to oldfid even though ownership of oldfid remains with the caller. If this is the last reference, oldfid can be clunked and destroyed while the caller still expects it to be valid. A later use or put of oldfid can then trigger a use-after-free or refcount underflow. Fix this by only putting fid in the clunk_fid error path when it does not alias oldfid, matching the existing guard in the error path below. This can be triggered when a multi-component walk is split into multiple p9_client_walk() calls and a later non-cloning walk fails. A reproducer and refcount warning logs are available on request.
CVE-2026-64102CVSS 9.8In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/siw: Reject MPA FPDU length underflow before signed receive math A malicious connected siw peer can send an iWARP FPDU whose MPA length field (c_hdr->mpa_len, 16 bit big-endian, peer-controlled) is smaller than the fixed DDP/RDMAP header for the announced opcode. Soft-iWARP parses the full header in siw_get_hdr() based on iwarp_pktinfo[opcode] .hdr_len, but never compares mpa_len against that header length. siw_tcp_rx_data() then derives srx->fpdu_part_rem = be16_to_cpu(mpa_len) - fpdu_part_rcvd + MPA_HDR_SIZE; where fpdu_part_rcvd equals iwarp_pktinfo[opcode].hdr_len at this point. For a tagged WRITE (hdr_len 16, MPA_HDR_SIZE 2) the smallest on-wire mpa_len of 0 yields fpdu_part_rem = -14, and any mpa_len below hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE underflows to a negative int. The signed value then flows into siw_proc_write()/siw_proc_rresp() as bytes = min(srx->fpdu_part_rem, srx->skb_new); is handed to siw_check_mem() as an int len (whose interval check addr + len > mem->va + mem->len is satisfied for a valid base when len is negative), and reaches siw_rx_data() -> siw_rx_kva() / siw_rx_umem() -> skb_copy_bits() as a signed copy length. The header copy branch in skb_copy_bits() promotes that to size_t, producing a multi-gigabyte read. KASAN under a KUnit harness that drives the real kernel TCP receive path -- a loopback AF_INET socketpair, the malformed FPDU written via kernel_sendmsg, sk_data_ready firing in softirq, tcp_read_sock dispatching to siw_tcp_rx_data -- reports: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_copy_bits+0x284/0x480 Read of size 4294967295 at addr ffff888... Call Trace: skb_copy_bits siw_rx_kva siw_rx_data siw_check_mem siw_proc_write siw_tcp_rx_data __tcp_read_sock siw_qp_llp_data_ready tcp_data_ready tcp_data_queue Add the missing invariant at the earliest point where the peer header is fully assembled. iwarp_pktinfo[*].hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE is exactly the value the siw transmitter uses as the minimum mpa_len for each opcode (drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp.c:33), so this matches the protocol contract. Out-of-range FPDUs terminate the connection with TERM_ERROR_LAYER_LLP / LLP_ETYPE_MPA / LLP_ECODE_FPDU_START -- which is RFC 5044 Section 8 error code 3 ("Marker and ULPDU Length fields do not agree on the start of an FPDU"), the correct framing-error class for this inconsistency.
CVE-2026-98490CVSS 9.8In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: conntrack: fix helper UAF due to extensions realloc While calling the helpers, a raw pointer to the extensions area is wired into expectations list: -> nf_ct_helper() -> helper->help() -> nf_ct_expect_related_report() -> nf_ct_expect_insert() -> hlist_add_head_rcu(&exp->lnode, &master_help->expectations) In case the connection is not confirmed yet, more extensions can be added afterwards with *_ext_add() calls reallocating the extension space and leaving the now invalid pointer in the expectations list that is later accessed while removing the expectation. Make sure that helpers are called at the end after all the other extensions are already added. Note that the helper rejection now leaves the mark and labels set, but that's not different from how the NAT was handled before or how the mark and the labels were handled on confirmation failure. And there are no atomicity guarantees provided by the API anyway.
CVE-2026-64232CVSS 9.8In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: recompute nr_integrity_segments in blk_insert_cloned_request blk_insert_cloned_request() already recomputes nr_phys_segments against the bottom queue, because "the queue settings related to segment counting may differ from the original queue." The exact same reasoning applies to integrity segments: a stacked driver's underlying queue can have tighter virt_boundary_mask, seg_boundary_mask, or max_segment_size than the top queue, in which case blk_rq_count_integrity_sg() against the bottom queue produces a different count than the cached rq->nr_integrity_segments inherited from the source request by blk_rq_prep_clone(). When the cached count is lower than the bottom queue's actual count, blk_rq_map_integrity_sg() trips BUG_ON(segments > rq->nr_integrity_segments); on dispatch. The same families of stacked setups that motivated the existing nr_phys_segments recompute -- dm-multipath fanning out to nvme-rdma in particular -- can produce this. Mirror the nr_phys_segments handling: when the request carries integrity, recompute nr_integrity_segments against the bottom queue and reject the request if it exceeds the bottom queue's max_integrity_segments. blk_rq_count_integrity_sg() and queue_max_integrity_segments() are both already available via <linux/blk-integrity.h>, which blk-mq.c includes. This closes a latent gap in the stacking contract and brings the integrity-segment accounting in line with the existing phys-segment accounting.
CVE-2026-98548CVSS 9.8In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: discard the rest of the packet on a stale-cookie error When an association is in COOKIE-ECHOED state and the peer sends a bundled [ERROR(Stale Cookie)][DATA] packet from one of its non-primary addresses, processing the ERROR chunk takes the non-fatal stale-cookie retry path sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which queues SCTP_CMD_DEL_NON_PRIMARY while keeping the association alive. sctp_cmd_del_non_primary() removes every non-primary transport - including the very transport this packet arrived on, which is still referenced by the receive lookup and shared by all chunks of the packet via chunk->transport. sctp_assoc_rm_peer() does redirect asoc->peer.last_data_from away from the removed transport, but right afterwards the bundled DATA chunk makes sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() re-register asoc->peer.last_data_from = chunk->transport unconditionally, undoing the redirection with the just-removed transport. Once the packet is done, the receive reference is dropped and the transport is RCU-freed, while the surviving association keeps the dangling last_data_from. A later FWD-TSN (or the delayed SACK timer) makes sctp_gen_sack() dereference it (->param_flags and friends), and sctp_make_sack()/sctp_outq_select_transport() may write to the freed object and link it into the live transport list. This is a use-after-free triggerable by any malicious SCTP peer (or a local unprivileged user acting as one) with no capabilities required: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sctp_do_sm+0x498a/0x5660 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800e1e356c by task poc/115 Call Trace: sctp_do_sm <- sctp_assoc_bh_rcv <- sctp_inq_push <- sctp_rcv <- ip_protocol_deliver_rcu <- ip_rcv Allocated: sctp_transport_new <- sctp_assoc_add_peer <- sctp_process_init (INIT-ACK processing) Freed: kfree <- sctp_transport_destroy_rcu <- rcu_core (call_rcu queued by sctp_transport_put at end of sctp_rcv) The buggy address is located 364 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region [ffff88800e1e3400, ffff88800e1e3800), cache kmalloc-1k Note that commit 03a9d10ecf71 ("sctp: drop a chunk if its transport was removed") only covers the window between the receive lookup and the chunk processing (e.g. an ASCONF DEL-IP racing the socket backlog); here the transport is removed *while* the packet is being processed, by an earlier chunk of the same packet, so the drop in sctp_inq_push() does not reach this path. Verified with the bundled [ERROR(Stale Cookie)][DATA] + FWD-TSN reproducer: the KASAN report above still fires with that commit applied, and is gone with this patch on top. Fix it by discarding the rest of the packet on this path, as suggested by Xin. After the stale-cookie ERROR has sent the association back to COOKIE-WAIT and removed the non-primary transports, the remaining chunks of the packet can only run against the restarted handshake while referencing the removed arrival transport through chunk->transport: besides the last_data_from registration above, sctp_cmd_setup_t2() and the sctp_make_*() reply builders would also copy that pointer into association-lifetime state that sctp_assoc_rm_peer() has already sanitized. Let the peer retransmit them, in line with what sctp_inq_push() does for chunks whose transport was removed before processing.

References

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