Linux CVEs under active exploitation, measured on real servers

Ten CVEs are currently being exploited against the Linux servers Defensia monitors. Every figure below is our own measurement, taken from attack traffic hitting real production servers over the last 30 days — not a republished advisory feed, and not a honeypot.

Last measured . Updated daily.

10 CVEs measured under active exploitation

CVEs observed under active exploitation against the Linux servers Defensia monitors, with the share of monitored servers targeted, distinct attacking IP addresses, days observed and the dates first and last seen.
CVESoftware Servers targeted peak, % monitored Attacker IPs distinctDays observedFirst seenLast seenSignals
CVE-2024-4577PHP38%14587
critical CVSS 9.8 Confirmed Spreading fast
CVE-2025-30208Vite36%18251
medium CVSS 5.3 Confirmed Spreading fast
CVE-2021-41773Apache26%7718
critical CVSS 10 Confirmed Spreading fast
CVE-2012-1823PHP12%3012
critical CVSS 9.8Steady
CVE-2018-17246Kibana8.7%3615
critical CVSS 9.8Declining
CVE-2018-13379Fortiproxy7.6%74
critical CVSS 9.1Steady
CVE-2019-18935Telerik5.4%116
critical CVSS 9.8Steady
CVE-2024-36401Geoserver4.3%75
critical CVSS 9.8Steady
CVE-2021-44228Log4j4.3%32
critical CVSS 10Steady
CVE-2021-28164—4.3%62
No NVD advisory Declining

How these numbers are measured

Defensia agents read the web server logs of the Linux servers they protect and match incoming requests against exploitation signatures. A CVE only appears on this page once the same signature has matched across several independent servers, from several distinct networks, with most of the traffic coming from something other than a known scanner. Those thresholds exist to keep a single noisy source, or one security scan, from looking like a campaign.

Confirmed is the stricter claim, and it needs a larger share of the fleet, more distinct sources and high-confidence signatures before it is applied. No NVD advisory means the CVE had no published NVD advisory at the time the exploitation was recorded. It describes the state of the advisory record on that date, and nothing about who observed the exploitation first.

Counts are of distinct servers and distinct source addresses, never of requests. Request volume is a poor measure of how widespread an attack is: a handful of sources hammering one target produces a large number and tells you very little. These servers are real production hosts running real applications, which is what separates this from a honeypot network — every figure describes exploitation attempted against software somebody actually depends on.

The research page sets out the full method behind these figures — how the populations are defined and counted, what the agent can and cannot see, and fleet-wide attack volume with a machine-readable export. If you are about to cite anything from this page, read that one first.

Privacy

Nothing on this page identifies a customer. The underlying records hold counts, dates and the country codes of attacking addresses, and no server name, domain, address or organisation — there is nothing in them to withhold. Figures are reported as a share of monitored servers rather than as absolute counts.

See this traffic hitting your own servers

The attacks above were detected on production Linux servers running the Defensia agent. It reads your web logs, detects exploitation attempts and blocks the source. Free for 1 server.

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